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stored in a database without revealing any information about the identity of the requested file. Existing
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and information leakage in terms of mutual information (MI) and maximal leakage (MaxL) privacy
metrics. By relating the WPIR problem to rate-distortion theory, the download-leakage function, which
is defined as the minimum required download cost of all single-server WPIR schemes for a given level
of information leakage, is introduced. By characterizing the download-leakage function for the MI and
MaxL metrics, the capacity of single-server WPIR is fully described.
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I. INTRODUCTION
User privacy is becoming increasingly important both socially and politically in today’s
modern age of information (as demonstrated, for instance, by the European Union’s General
Data Protection Regulation). In this context, private information retrieval (PIR), introduced by
Chor et al. in [1], has gained traction in the information theory community. In PIR, a user can
retrieve a file from a database without revealing its identity to the servers storing it. From an
information-theoretic perspective, the file size is typically much larger than the size of the queries
to all servers. Therefore rather than accounting for both the upload and the download cost, as
is usually done in the computer science community, here efficiency is measured in terms of the
download cost. More precisely, efficiency is measured in terms of PIR rate, which is the ratio
between the requested file size and the total number of symbols downloaded. The supremum of
the PIR rate over all possible schemes is called the PIR capacity.
PIR was first addressed in the information theory literature by Shah et al. [2], while the tradeoff
between storage overhead and PIR rate was first considered in [3]. Shortly after, Sun and Jafar [4]
characterized the PIR capacity for the classical PIR model of replicated servers. Since then the
concept of PIR has been extended to several relevant scenarios: maximum distance separable
(MDS) coded servers [5], [6], arbitrary linear coded servers [7]–[9], colluding servers [5], [7],
[9]–[13], robust PIR [10], PIR with Byzantine servers [14], optimal upload cost of PIR, i.e., the
smallest query information required to be sent to the servers [15], access complexity of PIR, i.e.,
the total number of symbols needed to be accessed across all servers in order to privately retrieve
an arbitrary file [16], single-server PIR with private side information [17], PIR on graph-based
replication systems [18], PIR with secure storage [19], functional PIR codes [20], and private
proximity retrieval codes [21].
Weakly-private information retrieval (WPIR) [22]–[24] is an interesting extension of the
original PIR problem as it allows for improvements in the download cost at the expense of some
information leakage to the servers on the identity of the requested file. In particular, [22] considers
the multi-server case with mutual information (MI) and worst-case information leakage [25] as
privacy metrics, while [24] includes results for the maximum leakage (MaxL) privacy metric as
well as converse bounds. In [23], Samy et al., under the name of leaky PIR, consider a privacy
metric related to differential privacy for the multi-server case. The multi-server case under the
MaxL privacy metric has also been recently studied by Zhou et al. [26].
In the computer science literature, to the best of our knowledge there are only a few works that
have considered lifting the perfect privacy requirement of PIR in order to improve performance.
In the first work [27], which appeared almost two decades ago, the full privacy condition was
relaxed by introducing the concept of repudiation. A protocol assures the repudiation property
if the probability of all designed queries to retrieve any file stored in the database is strictly
smaller than one. Hence, the user can deny any claim about the identity of the desired file
by the server. However, the condition of repudiation can be achieved even if the server can
determine the identity of the requested file almost surely, and thus, it does not provide a good
level of information-theoretic privacy. More recently, Toledo et al. [28] adopted a privacy metric
based on differential privacy in order to enhance the efficiency of PIR by lowering the level
of privacy. Moreover, both works did not study any fundamental information-theoretic tradeoffs
between information leakage and different costs under the considered privacy metrics. In contrast
to WPIR, where the information leakage to the servers is considered, recently, the authors of [29]
studied the information leakage of the nondesired files to the user in PIR systems. Furthermore,
along the same lines of research, leaky PIR was extended to the symmetric PIR setting in [30].
Symmetric PIR is a variant of PIR where in addition to the privacy request, the user cannot learn
anything about the remaining files in the database when the user retrieves its desired file [31].
In [30], the symmetric PIR requirement of zero information leakage on the nondesired files as
well as the perfect privacy requirement on the identity of the requested file are both lifted in
order to improve on the download rate.
In distributed storage systems (DSSs), for several applications, it is more realistic to assume
that all servers can collude. In the single server scenario, it can be shown that all files stored
in the database need to be downloaded to guarantee strong privacy [32]. This implies that the
PIR rate tends to zero as the number of stored files increases. In [17], the authors introduce PIR
schemes that improve the download cost by leveraging on the assumption that the user has some
prior side information on the content of the database. Lastly, latent-variable PIR for the single
server setting was introduced in [33]. The goal of latent-variable PIR is to completely hide the
latent attributes induced by the requested file identity. The latent-variable PIR framework can be
seen as a variant of WPIR as no leakage on the latent attributes can be achieved even if parts
of the identity of the requested file are leaked.
In this paper, we relax the condition of perfect privacy in the single server setting. In similar
lines to [22], we show that by relaxing the strong privacy requirement, the download cost can
be improved. Like [24], we consider both the MI and MaxL privacy metrics [34], [35], where
the latter is the most robust information-theoretic metric for information leakage yet known.
In particular, we establish a connection between the single-server WPIR problem and rate-
distortion theory, which provides fundamental insights to describe the optimal tradeoff between
the download cost and the allowed information leakage. The primary contribution of this work is
to characterize the capacity (the inverse of the minimum download cost) of single-server WPIR
when the information leakage to the server is measured in terms of MI or MaxL. Furthermore,
we propose a simple novel single-server WPIR scheme that achieves the WPIR capacity for both
the MI and MaxL privacy metrics.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section II presents the notation,
definitions, and the problem formulation. In Section III, we introduce the download-leakage
function of single-server WPIR, which is defined as the minimum achievable download cost for
a given information leakage constraint. Moreover, we discuss some properties of the function
when the leakage is measured in terms of the MI or MaxL metrics. In Section IV, a basic solution
for single-server WPIR is presented in which the files are partitioned into several partitions. In
Section V, we give a closed-form expression for the single-server WPIR capacity for both the MI
and MaxL metrics. A capacity-achieving WPIR scheme is proposed in Section VI. The converse
result on the minimum download cost for the MI metric is provided in Section VII, while that
of the MaxL metric is given in Section VIII. Finally, Section IX concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. Notation
We denote by N the set of all positive integers, [a] , {1, 2, . . . , a}, and [a : b] , {a, a +
1, . . . , b} for a, b ∈ {0} ∪N and a ≤ b. The set of nonnegative real numbers is denoted by R+.
Vectors are denoted by bold letters, matrices by sans serif capital letters, and sets by calligraphic
uppercase letters, e.g., x, X, and X , respectively. In general, vectors are represented as row
vectors throughout the paper. We use uppercase letters for random variables (RVs) (either scalar
or vector), e.g., X or X . For a given index set S, we write XS to represent {X(m) : m ∈ S}.
X ⊥ Y means that the two RVs X and Y are independent. (·)T denotes the transpose of its
argument. The Hamming weight of a vector x is denoted by wH(x), while its support will be
denoted by χ(x). EX [·] and EPX [·] denote expectation with respect to the RV X and distribution
PX , respectively. H(X), H(PX), or H
(
p1, . . . , p|X |
)
represents the entropy of X , where PX(·) =
(p1, . . . , p|X |) denotes the distribution of the RV X . I(X ;Y ) denotes the MI between X and Y .
B. System Model
We consider a single server that stores M independent files X(1), . . . ,X(M), where each file
X(m) =
(
X
(m)
1 , . . . , X
(m)
β
)
, m ∈ [M], is represented as a length-β row vector over X . Assume
that each element of X(m) is chosen independently and uniformly at random from X . Thus,
we have H
(
X(m)
)
= β log2 |X | bits, ∀m ∈ [M]. A user wishes to efficiently retrieve X(M) by
allowing some information leakage to the server, where the requested file index M is assumed
to be uniformly distributed over [M].1 Similar to the detailed mathematical description in [22],
we give the following definition for a single-server WPIR scheme.
Definition 1. An M-file WPIR scheme C for a single server storing M files consists of:
• A random strategy S, whose alphabet is S.
• A query function
φ : {1, . . . ,M} × S → Q
that generates a query Q = φ(M,S) with alphabet Q. The query Q is sent to the server
to retrieve the M -th file.
• An answer function
ϕ : Q×X βM → AβL
that returns the answer A = ϕ(Q,X [M]) back to the user, with download symbol alphabet
A. Here, L = L(Q) is the normalized length of the answer, which is a function of the query
Q.
• A privacy leakage metric ρ(·)(PQ|M) ≥ 0, which is defined as a function of the conditional
probability mass function (PMF) PQ|M , that measures the amount of leaked information of
the identity of the requested file to the server by observing the generated query Q, where
the superscript “(·)” indicates the used metric.
1Note that the requested file index M does not necessarily need to be uniformly distributed, which is referred to as semantic
PIR in the literature [36].
Furthermore, the scheme should allow a user to retrieve the requested file from the answer, the
query, and the index of the requested file. In other words, this scheme must satisfy the condition
of perfect retrievability,
H
(
X(M)
∣∣A,Q,M) = 0. (1)
We remark that a PIR scheme corresponds to a WPIR scheme for which no information
leakage is allowed.
C. Metrics of Information Leakage
Given a single-server M-file WPIR scheme and a fixed distribution PM , the conditional PMF
of the query given the index M of the requested file, PQ|M , can be seen as a privacy mechanism
(a randomized mapping). The server receives the random outcome Q of the privacy mechanism
PQ|M , and is curious about the index M of the requested file. The information leakage of a
WPIR scheme is then measured with respect to its corresponding privacy mechanism PQ|M .
In this paper, we focus on two commonly-used information-theoretic measures, namely MI
and MaxL. For the former, the information leakage is quantified by
ρ(MI)(PQ|M) , I(M ;Q). (2)
The second privacy metric, MaxL, can be defined based on the min-entropy (MinE) measure
discussed in the computer science literature, see, e.g., [34]. The initial uncertainty about the RV
M , quantified by the MinE measure, is defined as
H∞(M) , − log2 max
m∈[M]
PM(m).
Note that MinE is a special case of the widely known Rényi entropy [37],
Hα(M) ,
1
1− α log2
 ∑
m∈[M]
PM(m)
α
, α > 0 with α 6= 1.
It is known that Hα(M) converges to H∞(M) as α → ∞. The conditional MinE measure
H∞(M |Q) of M given Q,
H∞(M |Q) , − log2
∑
q∈Q
PQ(q) max
m∈[M]
PM |Q(m|q),
quantifies the remaining uncertainty about M given Q. Thus, the MinE information leakage
I∞(M ;Q) for the privacy mechanism PQ|M is defined as the difference between the initial
uncertainty H∞(M) and the remaining uncertainty H∞(M |Q), i.e.,
I∞(M ;Q) , H∞(M)− H∞(M |Q).
It is worth mentioning that since we assume that M is uniformly distributed, the MinE
information leakage and the MaxL privacy metric can be shown to be equivalent [35], [38].
We review a closed-form expression of the MaxL metric below.
Proposition 1 ([38, Th. 1], [35, Th. 1]).
MaxL(M ;Q) , log2
∑
q∈Q
max
m∈[M]
PQ|M(q|m)
= I∞(M ;Q). (3)
Henceforth, we will use the closed-form expression in (3) as the MaxL privacy metric for
PQ|M . We denote by
ρ(MaxL)(PQ|M) , MaxL(M ;Q)
the privacy metric of a WPIR scheme under the MaxL privacy metric. It is also worth mentioning
that there is a relation between MaxL and differential privacy [39], see, e.g., [38, Th. 3].
The following lemma summarizes some useful properties for both the MI and MaxL privacy
metrics.
Lemma 1 (Data processing inequalities [35, Lem. 1, Cor. 1]). For any joint distribution PX,Y ,
1) if the RVs X, Y , and Z form a Markov chain, then
I(X ;Z) ≤ min{I(X ;Y ), I(Y ;Z)}, and
MaxL(X ;Z) ≤ min{MaxL(X ;Y ),MaxL(Y ;Z)}.
2) Consider a fixed distribution PX . Then, both I(X ;Y ) and 2MaxL(X ;Y ) are convex functions
in PY |X .
Throughout the paper, the information leakage metric of a WPIR scheme C is denoted by
ρ(·)(C ).
D. Download Cost and Rate for a Single-Server WPIR Scheme
In contrast to PIR, the download cost for WPIR may be different for the retrieval of different
files. Hence, the download cost is defined as the expected download cost over all possible
requested files. The download cost of a single-server WPIR scheme C for the retrieval of the
m-th file, denoted by D(m)(C ), is defined as the normalized expected length of the returned
answer over all random queries,
D(m)(C ) ,
log2 |A|EPQ|M=m [L(Q)]
log2 |X |
,
and the overall download cost, denoted by D(C ), is measured in terms of the normalized expected
download cost over all files, i.e.,
D(C ) ,
log2 |A|EPM
[
EPQ|M [L(Q)]
]
log2 |X |
= γ EM,Q[L(Q)], (4)
where γ , log2 |A|/log2 |X |.2 Accordingly, the WPIR rate is defined as R(C ) , D(C )−1.
Intuitively, a smaller download cost can be achieved if we allow a higher level of information
leakage. In this paper, our goal is to characterize the optimal tradeoff between the download
cost and the allowed information leakage with respect to a privacy metric. We start with the
following definition of an achievable download-leakage pair.
Definition 2. Consider a single server that stores M files. A download-leakage pair (D, %) is
said to be achievable in terms of the information leakage metric ρ(·) if there exists a WPIR
scheme C such that γ EM,Q[L(Q)] ≤ D and ρ(·)(C ) ≤ %. The download-leakage region is the
set of all achievable download-leakage pairs (D, %).
Remark 1. By Definition 2, it is clear that if the pair (D, %) is achievable, then the pair (D′, %′)
with D′ ≥ D and %′ ≥ % is also achievable.
2In [40], we assumed that the sizes of the download symbol alphabet and the file symbol alphabet are the same, i.e., γ = 1.
Here, for completeness, we consider the more general setting where the sizes can be different. However, the single-server WPIR
capacity is the same in both cases.
III. CHARACTERIZATION OF THE OPTIMAL DOWNLOAD-LEAKAGE TRADEOFF
Consider a single-server WPIR scheme, where the leakage is measured by ρ(MI) or ρ(MaxL).
The minimum achievable download cost for a given leakage constraint % can be formulated as
the optimization problem
minimize γ EPMPQ|M [L(Q)]
subject to PQ|M ∈ Pret, (5a)
ρ(·)(PQ|M) ≤ %, (5b)
where Pret is defined as the set of all PMFs that satisfy (1).
We remark that since PM is assumed to be a uniform distribution, the minimization is taken
over the set of all conditional distributions PM |Q such that (5a) and (5b) are satisfied. For
convenience, since we know that a designed conditional distribution PQ|M of a WPIR scheme
always satisfies (5a), throughout this paper we will assume that any PQ|M ∈ Pret.
A. The Download-Leakage Function for Single-Server WPIR
To characterize the optimal achievable pairs of download cost and information leakage, we
define two functions that describe the boundary of the download-leakage region.
Definition 3. The download-leakage function D(·)(%) for single-server WPIR is the minimum of
all possible download costs D for a given information leakage constraint % such that (D, %) is
achievable, i.e.,
D(·)(%) , γ min
PQ|M : ρ(·)(PQ|M )≤%
EPMPQ|M [L(Q)].
Accordingly, the single-server WPIR capacity is C(·)(%) =
[
D(·)(%)
]−1.
It is known that the single-server PIR capacity is CM = 1M [32].
Naturally, we can also determine the optimal download-leakage region by interchanging the
roles of the download cost and the information leakage.
Definition 4. The leakage-download function ρ(·)(D) for single-server WPIR is the minimum of
all possible information leakages % for a given download cost constraint D such that (D, %) is
achievable.
Lemma 2. 1) The MI download-leakage function
D(MI)(%) = γ min
PQ|M : I(PQ|M )≤%
EPMPQ|M [L(Q)]
is convex in %.
2) The MaxL download-leakage function
D(MaxL)(%) = γ min
PQ|M : MaxL(PQ|M )≤%
EPMPQ|M [L(Q)]
is not a convex function, but D(MaxL)(log2(%)) is convex in %.
Proof: For simplicity, we assume γ = 1. We first prove the lemma for MI leakage.
Assume that D(MI)(%1) = EPMPQ∗1|M [L(Q)] and D
(MI)(%2) = EPMPQ∗2|M [L(Q)] are achieved by
the distributions PQ∗1|M and PQ∗2|M , respectively, where I(M ;Q
∗
1) ≤ %1 and I(M ;Q∗2) ≤ %2. Let
PQλ|M be the distribution
PQλ|M = (1− λ)PQ∗1|M + λPQ∗2|M .
It can be seen that PQλ|M ∈ Pret.
Observe that since I(M ;Q) is convex in PQ|M , it follows that I
(
(1− λ)PQ∗1|M + λPQ∗2|M
) ≤
(1 − λ) I(PQ∗1|M) + λ I(PQ∗2|M) ≤ (1 − λ)%1 + λ%2, which implies that PQλ|M is an element of
{PQ|M : I(PQ|M) ≤ (1− λ)%1 + λ%2}.
Thus, by definition we get
D(MI)((1− λ)%1 + λ%2)
= min
PQ|M : I(PQ|M )≤(1−λ)%1+λ%2
EPMPQ|M [L(Q)]
≤ EPMPQλ|M [L(Q)]
(a)
= (1− λ)EPMPQ∗1|M [L(Q)] + λEPMPQ∗2|M [L(Q)]
= (1− λ)D(MI)(%1) + λD(MI)(%2),
where (a) follows directly from the definition of PQλ|M . This shows that D
(MI)(%) is convex in
% for the MI metric. The proof for the MaxL metric is analogous, since 2MaxL(PQ|M ) is convex
in PQ|M .
From Remark 1 we can see that the convexity of the download-leakage function is very useful,
since it can help to describe the download-leakage region if some achievable pairs are known.
This observation can be summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Assume that both pairs (D1, %1) and (D2, %2) are achievable. Then, for any λ ∈
[0, 1], the pair
(
Dλ = (1−λ)D1 +λD2, %λ = (1−λ)%1 +λ%2
)
is achievable under MI leakage,
while the pair
(
Dλ = (1− λ)D1 + λD2, %λ = log2 [(1− λ)2%1 + λ2%2 ]
)
is achievable for MaxL.
B. Connection to Rate-Distortion Theory
The celebrated rate-distortion theory of Shannon and Kolmogorov (see, e.g., [41, Ch. 9], [42,
Ch. 10], and references therein) determines the minimum source compression rate required to
reproduce any source sequence under a fidelity constraint, which is provided through a distortion
measure between the source sequence and the reconstructed sequence. Consider an information
source sequence with independent and identically distributed components according to PX and
a distortion measure d(x, xˆ) between the source sequence x and the reconstructed sequence xˆ.
The optimal rate-distortion region is characterized by the rate-distortion function, defined as the
minimum achievable compression rate I(X ;Xˆ) under a given constraint on the average distortion
EPXPXˆ|X
[
d(X, Xˆ)
]
, where Xˆ represents the reconstructed source.
One important observation from (4) is that, if we add the desired file index m as an argument
to the answer-length function L by defining L(m, q) , L(q) for all m ∈ [M] for which
PQ|M(q|m) > 0, and L(m, q) , ∞ otherwise (i.e., an infinite length for a given m and query
realization q indicates that q is never sent when requesting the m-th file), then the download
cost can be expressed as EPMPQ|M [L(Q)] = EPMPQ|M [L(M,Q)]. Thus, in terms of the MI
privacy metric, the leakage-download function can be related to the rate-distortion function,
where the leakage and the download cost play similar roles as the compression rate and the
average distortion, respectively. Below, we will equivalently use either L(q) or L(m, q) (as
defined above). We defer the detailed discussion to Section VII where we will utilize results
from rate-distortion theory to characterize the optimal leakage-download tradeoff for single-server
WPIR.
IV. PARTITION WPIR SCHEME
In [22], a WPIR scheme based on partitioning was proposed. The files are first partitioned into
η equally-sized partitions, each consisting of Mη files, where Mη = M/η ∈ N. If there exists a
viable Mη-file WPIR scheme, the user can apply the Mη-file WPIR scheme as a subscheme on
each partition, and retrieve a file from the corresponding partition.
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Fig. 1. (a) The capacity C(·)(%¯) for a small number of files M = 2, 3, 4 with privacy metrics ρ(MI) and ρ(MaxL). (b) The
capacity C(·)(%¯) for a large number of files M = 10, 50 with privacy metrics ρ(MI) and ρ(MaxL). The dark green circles mark
the achievable rate-leakage pairs of C basic.
The partition M-file WPIR scheme is formally described as follows. Assume that the requested
file X(m) belongs to the j-th partition, where j ∈ [η]. Then, the query Q is constructed as
Q =
(rQ, j) ∈ Q˜ × [η], (6)
where rQ is the query of an existing Mη-file WPIR scheme.
The following theorem states the achievable download-leakage pairs of the partition scheme.
Theorem 1. Consider a single server that stores M files and let Mη = M/η ∈ N, η ∈ N.
Assume that an Mη-file WPIR scheme C˜ with achievable download-leakage pair
(rD, %˜) exists.
Then, the download-leakage pair(
D(C ), ρ(·)(C )
)
=
(rD, %˜+ log2 η) (7)
is achievable by the M-file partition scheme C constructed from C˜ as described in (6).
Proof: We prove the theorem for the MaxL privacy metric, while the proof for the MI
metric is provided in [24] (see proof of Theorem 2). We refer to the requested file index M
by the pair (M˜, j), where M˜ represents the requested file index in the j-th partition, j ∈ [η].
Hence, from (3), we have
2MaxL(M ;Q) =
∑
q∈Q
max
m∈[M]
PQ|M(q|m)
=
∑
j∈[η]
∑
q˜∈Q˜
max
m∈[M]
PQ|M(q|m)
(a)
=
∑
j∈[η]
∑
q˜∈Q˜
max
m∈[Mη ]
PrQ|M˜(q˜|m)
= η · 2MaxL(M˜ ; rQ) ≤ 2log2 η+%˜,
where (a) follows since for the j-th partition, the conditional PMF PQ|M is equal to PrQ|M˜ of
the Mη-file WPIR scheme. Using a similar argumentation as above, it can also be verified that
R(C ) = R(C˜ ) ≤ rR.
Since a PIR scheme is also a WPIR scheme, this simple approach for the construction of WPIR
schemes can also be adapted to use any of the existing Mη-file PIR schemes in the literature as a
subscheme. We refer to the partition scheme that uses a PIR scheme as the underlying subscheme
and the query generation in (6) as a basic scheme and denote it by C basic (it achieves the pair
in (7) with %˜ = 0). It can be seen that for the single-server setting, the basic scheme simply
retrieves all the files in the partition that includes the requested file. This idea will be extended
to our capacity-achieving scheme presented in Section VI, where for any subset M⊆ [M] that
includes the requested file, all files in M are downloaded.
V. THE CAPACITY OF SINGLE-SERVER WPIR
The main result of this work is the characterization of the optimal tradeoff between the
download cost and the information leakage for single-server WPIR for an arbitrary number of
files for the MI and MaxL privacy metrics. The optimal download-leakage region for the MI
privacy metric is stated in the following theorem. For the sake of illustration, we consider the
normalized leakage-download function ρ¯(·) , ρ(·)
log2M
.
Theorem 2. For a single server that stores M files, the single-server WPIR capacity for the MI
leakage metric ρ(MI) is
C(MI)(%¯) =
[
w +
log2
M
w
log2
w
w−1
− %¯ log2M
log2
w
w−1
]−1
,
for 1− log2w
log2M
≤ %¯ ≤ 1− log2 (w − 1)
log2M
, w ∈ [2 : M]. (8)
The following theorem states the single-server WPIR capacity for the MaxL privacy metric.
Theorem 3. For a single server that stores M files, the single-server WPIR capacity for the
MaxL metric ρ(MaxL) is
C(MaxL)(%¯) =
[
w +
M
w
M
w−1 − Mw
− 2
%¯ log2M
M
w−1 − Mw
]−1
,
for 1− log2w
log2M
≤ %¯ ≤ 1− log2 (w − 1)
log2M
, w ∈ [2 : M].
The achievability proof of Theorems 2 and 3 appears in Section VI while the converse part
appears in Sections VII and VIII, for Theorems 2 and 3, respectively.
For the MI and MaxL privacy metrics, the achievable rate-leakage pairs of C basic in (7) and
the capacity C(·)(%¯) for different number of files M, are depicted in Fig. 1.
It is worthwhile noting that the download-leakage function
[
C(·)(·)]−1 is a piecewise
continuous function. For the MI privacy metric,
[
C(MI)(%)
]−1 is a piecewise linear function.
Note also that, when Mη = M/η ∈ N, the basic scheme C basic achieves the capacity for both
the MI and MaxL privacy metrics.
Next, we consider the asymptotic capacity of single-server WPIR, i.e., the capacity as the
number of files M tends to infinity. An upper bound on the single-server WPIR capacity for any
number of files is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 4. For a single server that stores M files, the single-server WPIR capacity under both
the MI metric ρ(MI) and the MaxL metric ρ(MaxL) is bounded from above by
C(·)(%¯) ≤ CUB(%¯) , 1
M1−%¯
, 0 ≤ %¯ ≤ 1.
Proof: Since it is easy to show that the capacity for MI leakage is larger than or equal to the
capacity for MaxL (see Fig. 1), we only need to prove that the inverse of (8) is bounded from
below by M1−%¯. Observe that M1−%¯ is a convex function of %¯ and each point
(
w, 1 − log2 w
log2M
)
,
w ∈ [M], lies on the curve described by that function, i.e., M1−%¯ = w for %¯ = 1− log2 w
log2M
. Thus,
by the convexity of M1−%¯, we have M1−%¯ ≤ [C(MI)(%¯)]−1, where the inequality follows since
the inverse of (8) can be seen as a convex combination of 1− log2 w
log2M
and 1− log2 (w−1)
log2M
, w ∈ [M].
In Fig. 2, the capacity C(·)(%¯) and the upper bound CUB(%¯) are plotted for M = 102, 103, 104,
and 106, which illustrates the asymptotic behavior of C(·)(%¯) as M tends to infinity. Observe
that from Theorems 2 and 3, we have C(·)(1) = 1 for either a finite or infinite number of files
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Fig. 2. The capacity C(·)(%¯) and its upper bound CUB(%¯) for a number of files M = 102, 103, 104, and 106 with privacy
metrics ρ(MI) and ρ(MaxL).
M. Hence, by Theorem 4 it can be shown that as M tends to infinity, the asymptotic capacity
is equal to
C(·)∞(%¯) =
0 if 0 ≤ %¯ < 1,1 if %¯ = 1.
This indicates that the asymptotic capacity is still equal to zero, unless the server exactly knows
the index of the requested file.
VI. ACHIEVABILITY
Throughout this section, the ratio γ of the download symbol alphabet to the file symbol
alphabet is assumed to be one, i.e., log2 |A| = log2 |X |. Moreover, for simplicity, we set β = 1,
i.e., H(X(m)) = log2 |X | bits, ∀m ∈ [M]. In fact, our proposed single-server WPIR capacity-
achieving scheme works for an arbitrary file size β, which indicates that subpacketization does
not improve the performance of single-server WPIR. We will later show that this scheme is
optimal for both the MI and MaxL privacy metrics.
A. Motivating Example 1: M = 2 Files
Assume that the single server stores M = 2 files, X(1)1 and X
(2)
1 . We design the queries and
answers via a conditional distribution PQλ|M defined as:
Qλ PQλ|M(q | 1) PQλ|M(q | 2) Aλ PQλ(q)
(1, 0) λ 0 X
(1)
1
λ
2
(0, 1) 0 λ X
(2)
1
λ
2
(1, 1) 1− λ 1− λ {X(1)1 , X(2)1 } 1− λ
where 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. It can be easily verified that the perfect retrievability condition of (1) is
satisfied. The corresponding download cost is a function of λ and is given by Dλ = [2(1−λ) +
λ] = 2 − λ. The MI leakage is I(M ;Q) = H(λ
2
, λ
2
, 1 − λ) − H(λ, 1 − λ) = λ and the MaxL
is MaxL(M ;Q) = log2(1 + λ). One can easily verify that this matches the download-leakage
function for M = 2 for both the MI and MaxL metrics.
The following remarks can be made from the M = 2 WPIR scheme above. First, it is clear
that the download-leakage pairs (D0, %0) = (2, 0) and (D1, %1) = (1, 1) are achievable in terms
of MI or MaxL, where the pairs are achievable by PQ0|M and PQ1|M , respectively. Secondly, the
conditional distribution PQλ|M can be seen as a convex combination of PQ0|M and PQ1|M . Hence,
from Corollary 1, the convex combination of D0 and D1, (1 − λ)D0 + λD1 = 2 − λ = Dλ, is
also achievable.
B. Motivating Example 2: M = 3 Files
Before describing the achievable scheme in detail for the general case of M files, we present
another example for M = 3. Based on the remarks made for the case M = 2, we generalize the
WPIR scheme by considering three achievable download-leakage pairs (D1, %1) = (1, log2 3),
(D2, %2) = (2, log2
3
2
), and (D3, %3) = (3, log2
3
3
= 0). In terms of the MI or MaxL privacy
metrics, one can check that the pair (Dw, %w) is achieved by the conditional distribution PQw|M ,
w ∈ [3], listed in Table I. Moreover, it is clear that the retrievability condition in (1) is satisfied
for any convex combination of the three PMFs.
TABLE I
THE CONDITIONAL PMFS PQw|M , w ∈ [3].
Q1 PQ1|M (q | 1) PQ1|M (q | 2) PQ1|M (q | 3) A1 PQ1(q)
(1, 0, 0) 1 0 0 X
(1)
1
1
3
(0, 1, 0) 0 1 0 X
(2)
1
1
3
(0, 0, 1) 0 0 1 X
(3)
1
1
3
Q2 PQ2|M (q | 1) PQ2|M (q | 2) PQ2|M (q | 3) A2 PQ2(q)
(1, 1, 0)
1
2
1
2
0
{
X
(1)
1 , X
(2)
1
} 1
3
(1, 0, 1)
1
2
0
1
2
{
X
(1)
1 , X
(3)
1
} 1
3
(0, 1, 1) 0
1
2
1
2
{
X
(2)
1 , X
(3)
1
} 1
3
Q3 PQ3|M (q | 1) PQ3|M (q | 2) PQ3|M (q | 3) A3 PQ3(q)
(1, 1, 1) 1 1 1
{
X
(1)
1 , X
(2)
1 , X
(3)
1
}
1
Now, construct two conditional query distributions as follows,
PQλ1 |M = (1− λ1)PQ2|M + λ1PQ1|M , (9)
PQλ2 |M = (1− λ2)PQ3|M + λ2PQ2|M , (10)
where 0 ≤ λ1, λ2 ≤ 1.
Using (4), (2), and (3), respectively, and the conditional PMFs listed in Table I (or, alternatively,
Corollary 1), it follows that the WPIR scheme defined by (9)–(10) achieves the download cost
D(C ) =

(1− λ1)D2 + λ1D1 = 2− λ1, 0 ≤ λ1 ≤ 1,
(1− λ2)D3 + λ2D2 = 3− λ2, 0 ≤ λ2 ≤ 1,
the MI leakage
ρ(MI) =

(1− λ1) log2 32 + λ1 log2 31 , 0 ≤ λ1 ≤ 1,
(1− λ2) log2 33 + λ2 log2 32 , 0 ≤ λ2 ≤ 1,
and the MaxL
ρ(MaxL) =

log2
(
(1− λ1)32 + λ1 31
)
, 0 ≤ λ1 ≤ 1,
log2
(
(1− λ2)33 + λ2 32
)
, 0 ≤ λ2 ≤ 1.
In terms of the MI or MaxL privacy metrics, it can be verified that the download cost corresponds
to the single-server WPIR capacity for M = 3. Note that for M > 2, the capacity is a piecewise
continuous function (see Fig. 1(a)).
C. Arbitrary Number of Files M
We describe the achievable scheme for the general case of M files. From Corollary 1, it
follows that it is sufficient to show that the download-leakage pairs
(Dw, %w) =
(
w, log2
M
w
)
, w ∈ [M],
are achievable.
1) Query Generation: Consider M random queries Qw, w ∈ [M], whose alphabet is Qw ,
{q = (q1, . . . , qM) ∈ {0, 1}M : wH(q) = w}. Each query q ∈ Qw sent to the server is generated
by the conditional PMF
PQw|M(q|m) =

1
(M−1w−1)
if m ∈ χ(q),
0 otherwise.
This is a valid query design, since for each m ∈ [M], we have ∑q∈Qw PQw|M(q|m) =∑
q∈Qw : m∈χ(q) PQw|M(q|m) = 1.
2) Answer Construction: The answer function ϕ maps the query q ∈ Qw onto A =
ϕ(q,X [M]) = X
χ(q)
1 . The answer length is L(q) = w.
3) Download Cost and Information Leakage: Clearly, the download cost is equal to
EPMPQw|M [L(Qw)] = w. The MI leakage is
ρ(MI)(PQw|M) = I(M ;Qw) = H(M)− H(M |Qw) = log2M− log2w = log2
M
w
and the MaxL is
ρ(MaxL)(PQw|M) = log2
∑
q∈Qw
max
m∈[M]
1(
M−1
w−1
) = log2 (Mw)(M−1
w−1
) = log2 Mw .
This completes the achievability proof of Theorems 2 and 3.
Notice that the presented capacity-achieving WPIR scheme can be seen as a generalization
of the basic WPIR scheme C basic. If M/η = w ∈ N, since (rD, %˜) = (w, 0) is achievable for
a w-file single-server PIR scheme, from Theorem 1 it follows that the download-leakage pair(
D(C basic), ρ(·)(C (basic))
)
= (w, log2 η) = (w, log2
M
w
) is also achievable by C basic for both the
MI and MaxL privacy metrics.
VII. CONVERSE OF THEOREM 2
Consider a single-server WPIR scheme where the leakage at the server is measured by
I(M ;Q). A general converse (upper bound) for Theorem 2 can be derived from the download-
leakage function of a given leakage constraint %, or equivalently, from the leakage-download
function of a given download cost constraint D. Here, we will use a known lower bound on
the rate-distortion function to prove the converse by focusing on the leakage-download function.
Similar to (5), the leakage-download function can be formulated as the convex optimization
problem
minimize I(M ;Q) (11a)
subject to γ EPMPQ|M [L(Q)] ≤ D. (11b)
The minimization is taken over the set of all conditional distributions PQ|M such that (11b)
is satisfied, namely the set
FD =
{
PQ|M : γ
∑
q
∑
m∈[M]
PM(m)PQ|M(q|m)L(m, q) ≤ D
}
.
The proof consists of two parts. First, we show a lower bound to (11) by defining a new RV
that is a function of Q. To facilitate the exposition, we introduce the following notation.
• For any nonempty subsetM⊆ [M], we define Q˜M to be the set of queries that are designed
to recover the files X(m), m ∈ M, i.e., Q˜M , {q ∈ Q : H(X(m) |A,Q = q,M = m) =
0, ∀m ∈M}. Furthermore, define
QM , Q˜M \
( ⋃
M′⊆[M]\M
Q˜M′
)
.
The set QM contains all queries that are designed to recover all files in M, but no more.
Note that if q ∈ QM but m /∈M, then PQ|M(q|m) = 0.
• A binary length-M indicator vector 1M = (u1, . . . , uM) of a subset M ⊆ [M] is defined
as
um =
1 if m ∈M,0 otherwise.
Q is a RV that is induced by the conditional distribution PQ|M . Let us further define a new
RV U as
U(q) = 1M, for q ∈ QM, ∀M ⊆ [M]. (12)
Note that the mapping in (12) is well-defined since the query sets QM are disjoint and their
union is equal Q, i.e., they constitute a partition of Q. This leads to the conditional PMF
PU |M(u|m) =

∑
q∈Qχ(u) PQ|M(q|m) if m ∈ χ(u),
0 otherwise,
(13)
where PU |M ∈ Pret (the set of all PMFs that satisfy (1)).
We then design a WPIR scheme where the queries are generated according to PU |M and the
normalized answer-length function is constructed for any u ∈ {0, 1}M as
L(m,u) =
wH(u) if m ∈ χ(u),∞ otherwise,
where an infinite length for a given file index m and query u indicates that the m-th file is never
retrieved by the designed query u.
Accordingly, we define the set
PD =
{
PQ|M :
∑
u∈{0,1}M
∑
q∈Qχ(u)
∑
m∈[M]
PM(m)PQ|M(q|m)L(m,u) ≤ D
}
.
Given an arbitrary PQ|M ∈ FD, since∑
u∈{0,1}M
∑
m∈[M]
PM(m)PU |M(u|m)L(m,u)
=
∑
u∈{0,1}M
∑
m∈[M]
PM(m)
∑
q∈Qχ(u)
PQ|M(q|m)L(m,u)
(a)
≤
∑
u∈{0,1}M
∑
q∈Qχ(u)
∑
m∈[M]
PM(m)PQ|M(q|m)γL(m, q)
= γ
∑
q∈Q
∑
m∈[M]
PM(m)PQ|M(q|m)L(m, q) ≤ D,
where (a) holds because for any q ∈ Qχ(u) we know from the lossless source coding theorem
that the normalized length of the answer L(m, q) is larger than or equal to the ratio between
the total sizes of the retrieved wH(u) = L(m,u) files and the logarithm of the source code’s
alphabet, i.e., it satisfies L(m, q) ≥ L(m,u) log2 |X |/log2 |A| = L(m,u)γ−1.3 It follows that PQ|M
also lies in PD, and hence FD ⊆ PD. The intuition behind this fact is that the function L(m,u)
defines the minimum required lengths of answers for a valid single-server WPIR scheme, thus
we have more choices of conditional PMFs PQ|M in PD.
To simplify the notation, in the following we use p(q|m) and p(u|m) to denote the conditional
PMFs PQ|M and PU |M , respectively. If we take the minimization over PD, which is a candidate
set that is larger than FD, we have
min
p(q|m)∈FD
I(M ;Q) ≥ min
p(q|m)∈PD
I(M ;Q)
(a)
≥ min
p(u|m) : E[L(M,U)]≤D
I(M ;U), (14)
where (a) follows directly from the data processing inequality. Therefore, a lower bound to the
original leakage-download function is given.
In the second part of the proof, we show that (14) admits a closed-form expression by using
a useful result from rate-distortion theory, a lower bound on the rate-distortion function.4 This
lower bound is adapted to (14) and is re-stated as follows.
Lemma 3 ([41, Th. 9.4.1], [42, Th. 10.19]). Define
ρ(MI)(D) , min
p(u|m) : E[L(M,U)]≤D
I(M ;U),
where D ∈ [M]. Then,
ρ(MI)(D) ≥ H(M) +
∑
m∈[M]
PM(m) log2 νm − λD (15)
3The fundamental theorem of lossless data compression states that the expected codeword length is no less than
H(Xχ(u))/log2 |A| = wH(u) log2 |X|/log2 |A| = L(m,u) log2 |X|/log2 |A|, and the minimal expected codeword length can be achieved
by an optimal source code, e.g., a Huffman code (cf. [43, Thm. 5.4.1]). Here, since the files/sources are independent and
identically distributed, the codeword lengths are identical.
4The proof of this lower bound is based on the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions, see the details in [41],
[42].
for an arbitrary choice of λ > 0 and for any νm, m ∈ [M], satisfying∑
m∈[M]
νm2
−λL(m,u) ≤ 1, u ∈ {0, 1}M. (16)
We remark again that the length function L(m,u) is equal to wH(u) for all m ∈ χ(u). By
using the condition in (16) for each u with wH(u) = 1, we obtain∑
m∈[M]
νm2
−λL(m,u) =
∑
m∈χ(u)
νm2
−λwH(u)
= νm2
−λ ≤ 1, if m ∈ χ(u).
This implies that for any m ∈ [M], νm ·2−λ ≤ 1, and hence by symmetry, we can simply assume
that
νm = ν, ∀m.
Next, we apply (16) for all u ∈ {0, 1}M:
ν · 2−1λ ≤ 1 if wH(u) = 1,
2ν · 2−2λ ≤ 1 if wH(u) = 2,
3ν · 2−3λ ≤ 1 if wH(u) = 3,
...
Mν · 2−Mλ ≤ 1 if wH(u) = M.
From the above conditions, we obtain
log2 ν ≤

λ if λ > log2
2
1
,
2λ− log2 2 if log2 32 < λ ≤ log2 21 ,
3λ− log2 3 if log2 43 < λ ≤ log2 32 ,
...
Mλ− log2M if 0 < λ ≤ log2 MM−1 .
Now, taking
(log2 ν, λ) =
(
wλ− log2w, log2
w
w − 1
)
, w ∈ [2 : M],
and substituting this in (15) with PM(m) = 1M , we have
ρ(MI)(D) ≥ log2M+
(
w log2
w
w − 1 − log2w
)
−
(
log2
w
w − 1
)
D
1 M
slope: − log2 w−1w−2
slope: − log2 ww−1
slope: − log2 w+1w
(
w − 2, log2 Mw−2
)
(
w − 1, log2 Mw−1
)
(
w, log2
M
w
)(
w + 1, log2
M
w+1
)
D
ρ
(MI)
LB (D)
Fig. 3. An illustration of the function ρ(MI)LB (D), which is defined by many linear functions. The slope of the linear functions
is strictly increasing in w ∈ [2 : M].
= log2
M
w − 1 −
(
log2
w
w − 1
)
(D− (w − 1)), (17)
for w ∈ [2 : M].
Here, (17) is a linear function of D with slope −λ = − log2 ww−1 , which is strictly increasing
in w ∈ [2 : M]. Therefore, the best lower bound for ρ(MI)(D) is the piecewise function
ρ
(MI)
LB (D) =

log2
M
1
−
(
log2
2
1
)
(D− 1)
if 1 ≤ D ≤ 2,
log2
M
2
−
(
log2
3
2
)
(D− 2)
if 2 < D ≤ 3,
...
log2
M
M−1 −
(
log2
M
M−1
)
(D− (M− 1))
if M− 1 < D ≤M.
See also the pictorial illustration in Fig. 3. For instance, the red line log2
M
w−1 −
(
log2
w
w−1
)
(D−
(w − 1)) going through the points (w − 1, log2 Mw−1) and (w, log2 Mw ) has the largest function
values over the interval [w − 1, w].
It can be shown that the pair
(
%¯,D(MI)(%¯)
)
of Theorem 2 lies on ρ(MI)LB (D) (details are omitted
for brevity), which completes the converse proof.
VIII. CONVERSE OF THEOREM 3
Following an argumentation similar to the first part of the converse proof of Theorem 2,
since the MaxL metric also satisfies the data processing inequality from Lemma 2, the leakage-
download function for the MaxL privacy metric can be bounded from below by
ρ(MaxL)(D) , min
p(u|m) : E[L(M,U)]≤D
MaxL(M ;U). (18)
This by itself is not a convex minimization problem. In this proof, we derive a lower bound
to (18) directly. To make the problem tractable, we use the fact that 2MaxL(M ;U) is convex in
PU |M (see Lemma 1).
We know from (3) that maximizing the objective function MaxL(M ;U) is equivalent to
maximizing the function
2MaxL(M ;U) =
∑
u∈{0:1}M
max
m∈[M]
p(u|m).
Moreover, from (13) we know that
p(u|m) = 0, if u ∈ {0, 1}M, m /∈ χ(u).
Thus, (18) can be re-written as the convex minimization problem
minimize
∑
u∈{0,1}M
max
m∈χ(u)
p(u|m) (19a)
subject to
∑
u∈{0,1}M,m∈[M]
PM(m)p(u|m)L(m,u) ≤ D,
(19b)∑
u∈{0,1}M
p(u|m) = 1, ∀m ∈ [M]. (19c)
Furthermore, using the fact that∑
m∈χ(u)
p(u|m) ≤ wH(u) max
m∈χ(u)
p(u|m), ∀u ∈ {0, 1}M,
and
p(1{m}|m) = 1−
∑
u : m∈χ(u)
wH(u)>1
p(u|m), ∀m ∈ [M], (20)
the objective function (19a) becomes5∑
u
max
m∈χ(u)
p(u|m) =
∑
u : wH(u)=1
p(u|χ(u)) +
∑
u : wH(u)>1
max
m∈χ(u)
p(u|m)
=
∑
m∈[M]
[
1−
∑
u : m∈χ(u)
wH(u)>1
p(u|m)
]
+
∑
u : wH(u)>1
max
m∈χ(u)
p(u|m)
≥ M−
∑
m∈[M]
∑
u : m∈χ(u)
wH(u)>1
p(u|m) +
∑
u : wH(u)>1
∑
m∈χ(u)
p(u|m)
wH(u)
(a)
= M−
∑
u : wH(u)>1
∑
m∈χ(u)
(
1− 1
wH(u)
)
p(u|m),
where (a) holds since by expanding the double summation, one can see that∑
m∈[M]
∑
u : m∈χ(u)
wH(u)>1
p(u|m) =
∑
u : wH(u)>1
∑
m∈χ(u)
p(u|m).
Similarly, by substituting (20) into the download cost constraint (19b), we get∑
u
∑
m∈χ(u)
p(u|m)L(m,u) =
∑
wH(u)=1
∑
m∈χ(u)
p(u|χ(u)) · 1 +
∑
wH(u)>1
∑
m∈χ(u)
p(u|m)wH(u)
= M−
∑
wH(u)>1
∑
m∈χ(u)
p(u|m) +
∑
wH(u)>1
wH(u)
∑
m∈χ(u)
p(u|m)
= M+
∑
wH(u)>1
(wH(u)− 1)
 ∑
m∈χ(u)
p(u|m)
 ≤MD.
Next, define yw ,
∑
u : wH(u)=w
∑
m∈χ(u) p(u|m) for w ∈ [2 : M]. Because∑
u : wH(u)>1
(wH(u)− 1)
∑
m∈χ(u)
p(u|m) =
M∑
w=2
(w − 1)
∑
u : wH(u)=w
∑
m∈χ(u)
p(u|w),
it can be shown that a lower bound to (19) can be computed from the linear programming (LP)
formulation
minimize ρ(MaxL)LB (D) ,M−
M∑
w=2
[
1− 1
w
]
yw (21a)
subject to
M∑
w=2
yw ≤M, (21b)
5In the following, the ranges of the summations and also the explicit summation variable are sometimes omitted as they are
clear from the context.
M∑
w=2
(w − 1) · yw ≤M(D− 1), (21c)
with variables yw, w ∈ [2 : M].
We convert the inequalities in the constraints (21b) and (21c) to equalities by introducing
variables z1 and z2. Thus, we have the constraints as
M∑
w=2
yw + z1 = M,
M∑
w=2
(w − 1) · yw + z2 = M(D− 1).
Now, we further define cw , 1 − 1w , for w ∈ [2 : M], and set cM+1 = cM+2 = 0. In
a matrix form, we can write the objective function of (21) as M − c[y2, . . . , yM, z1, z2]T =
M−∑Mw=2(1− 1w)yw and the constraints as A[y, z]T = bT, where
A =
1 1 · · · 1 1 0
1 2 · · · M− 1 0 1
, bT =
 M
M(D− 1)
.
This LP problem can be solved using the simplex method [44]. The corresponding simplex
tableau of (21) is shown in Table II.
Consider a linear system of m equations and n variables. Then, a basic solution is a trivial
solution to the system of equations where a subset of n−m variables are zero, and the m nonzero
variables are referred to as the basic variables, while the remaining variables are known as the
nonbasic variables. The simplex algorithm is based on the following idea. Given a basic solution
for the constraints in an LP, one can arrive at the optimal solution to the LP by sequentially
(and selectively) converting nonbasic variables to basic variables.
To solve (21) using the simplex method, we start with a basic solution, where z1 = M,
z2 = M(D− 1), and yw = 0, w ∈ [2 : M]. Then, we arrive to the optimal solution by following
the cases below.
Case 1. 1 ≤ D ≤ 2: The variable y2 is chosen to be basic. Since argmini∈[2]{ biai,2 : ai,2 > 0} = 2,
set a2,2 = 1 to be the pivot and update all other rows by pivoting operations. We obtain the new
TABLE II
THE SIMPLEX TABLEAU OF (21), WHERE THE FIRST ROW INDICATES THE VARIABLES [y, z] = [y2, . . . , yM, z1, z2], THE
SECOND AND THIRD ROWS ARE OBTAINED FROM THE CONSTRAINTS A[y, z]T = bT , AND THE LAST ROW REPRESENTS THE
RELATIVE COST COEFFICIENTS OF THE EQUIVALENT (WITHOUT THE CONSTANT M) OBJECTIVE FUNCTION
−c[y, z]T = −∑Mw=2(1− 1w )yw .
y2 · · · yw−1 yw · · · yM z1 z2
a1,2 · · · a1,w−1 a1,w · · · a1,M a1,M+1 a1,M+2 b1
a2,2 · · · a2,w−1 a2,w · · · a2,M a2,M+1 a2,M+2 b2
c2 · · · cw−1 cw · · · cM 0 0 0
↓
y2 · · · yw−1 yw · · · yM z1 z2
1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1 1 0 M
1 · · · w − 2 w − 1 · · · M− 1 0 1 M(D− 1)
−
[
1− 1
2
]
· · · −
[
1− 1
w − 1
]
−
[
1− 1
w
]
· · · −
[
1− 1
M
]
0 0 0
simplex tableau as follows,
y2 · · · yw−1 yw · · · yM z1 z2
0 · · · 3− w 2− w · · · 2−M 1 −1 −M(D− 2)
1 · · · w − 2 w − 1 · · · M− 1 0 1 M(D− 1)
0 · · · w − 2
2
− w − 2
w − 1
w − 1
2
− w − 1
w
· · · M− 1
2
− M− 1
M
0
1
2
M(D− 1)
2
In this case, since all the updated relative cost coefficients can be shown to be positive for
M ≥ 2, this means that the solution is optimal.
Case 2. w − 1 < D ≤ w, w ∈ [3 : M]: We first choose yw−1 to be basic. Since in this case
argmini∈[2]
{
bi
ai,w−1
: ai,w−1 > 0
}
= 1, the pivot is a1,w−1 = 1. The updated simplex tableau
from Table II is given in Table III(a). Secondly, we choose yw to be basic. Again, because
TABLE III
(a) THE UPDATED SIMPLEX TABLEAU OF (21) WHEN yw−1 IS SET TO BE BASIC FOR w ∈ [3 : M]. (b) THE UPDATED SIMPLEX
TABLEAU OF (21) WHEN BOTH yw−1 AND yw ARE SET TO BE BASIC, w ∈ [3 : M].
y2 · · · yw−1 yw · · · yM z1 z2
1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1 1 0 M
1− (w − 2) · · · (w − 2)− (w − 2) = 0 (w − 1)− (w − 2) = 1 · · · M− 1− (w − 2) −(w − 2) 1 M(D− (w − 1))
[
1− 1
w − 1
]
−
[
1− 1
2
]
· · ·
[
1− 1
w − 1
]
−
[
1− 1
w − 1
]
= 0
[
1− 1
w − 1
]
−
[
1− 1
w
]
· · ·
[
1− 1
w − 1
]
−
[
1− 1
M
] [
1− 1
w − 1
]
0
[
M− M
w − 1
]
(a)
y2 · · · yw−1 yw · · · yM z1 z2
w − 2 · · · 1 0 · · · w −M w − 1 −1 M(w −D)
3− w · · · 0 1 · · · M+ 1− w −(w − 2) 1 M(D− (w − 1))
[
1
2
− 1
w − 1
]
+ (3− w)
[
1
w − 1 −
1
w
]
· · · 0 0 · · ·
[
1
M
− 1
w − 1
]
+ (M+ 1− w)
[
1
w − 1 −
1
w
] [
1− 1
w − 1
]
− (w − 2)
[
1
w − 1 −
1
w
] [
1
w − 1 −
1
w
] [
M− M
w − 1
]
+
[
M
w − 1 −
M
w
](
D− (w − 1))
(b)
argmini∈[2]
{
bi
ai,w
: ai,w > 0
}
= 2, this means that a2,w is the pivot. The updated simplex tableau
via pivoting is shown in Table III(b).
From Table III(b), we see that the relative cost coefficient for yw′ with w′, w ∈ [3 : M], w′ 6=
w − 1, w, is
1
w′
− 1
w − 1 + (w
′ + 1− w)
[
1
w − 1 −
1
w
]
.
Performing some simple calculations, we have
1
w′
− 1
w − 1 + (w
′ + 1− w)
[
1
w − 1 −
1
w
]
= (w − w′)
[
w − (w′ + 1)
w · w′(w − 1)
]
> 0,
either for w′ > (w− 1) or w′ < w. Moreover, it is easy to see that the relative cost coefficients
for z1 and z2 are [
1− 1
w − 1
]
− (w − 2)
[
1
w − 1 −
1
w
]
=
w − 2
w
> 0
and
(
1
w−1 − 1w
)
> 0, respectively. This implies that the current basic feasible solution is optimal.
Finally, we summarize the optimal solutions and the minimum values of (21) as follows:
y∗2 = M(D− 1),
y∗w′ = 0, w
′ 6= 2, where w′ ∈ [3 : M],
if 1 ≤ D ≤ 2,
y∗w−1 = M(w −D),
y∗w = M
(
D− (w − 1)),
y∗w′ = 0, w
′ 6= w − 1, w, where w′ ∈ [3 : M],
if w − 1 ≤ D ≤ w, w ∈ [3 : M],
and
ρ
(MaxL)
LB (D) =

M
1
− (M
1
− M
2
)(D− 1)
if 1 ≤ D ≤ 2,
M
2
− (M
2
− M
3
)
(D− 2)
if 2 < D ≤ 3,
...
M
M−1 −
(
M
M−1 − MM
)
(D− (M− 1))
if M− 1 < D ≤M.
It can be shown that the pair
(
2%,D(MaxL)(%)
)
of Theorem 3 lies on 2ρ
(MaxL)
LB (D) (details omitted
for brevity), which completes the converse proof.
IX. CONCLUSION
We considered relaxing the perfect privacy condition in single-server PIR and presented a
scheme for the studied weakly-private scenario, referred to as WPIR. In doing so, we showed
that one can trade off privacy to gain in terms of download cost. Furthermore, we characterized
the information leaked using two different metrics: MI and MaxL. The latter is known to be a
more robust metric to measure information leakage. Finally, we derived the single-server WPIR
capacity for both the MI and MaxL metrics, and showed that the proposed protocol is capacity-
achieving. As a final note, we drew the connection between WPIR and rate-distortion theory.
An interesting direction for future work is the derivation of fundamental bounds on other
performance metrics like the upload cost and the access complexity for the single server scenario.
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